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How historical connections, events and cultural proximity
can influence human development is being increasingly
recognized. One aspect of history that has only recently
begun to be examined is deep cultural ancestry, i.e. the
vertical relationships of descent between cultures, which can
be represented by a phylogenetic tree of descent. Here, we test
whether deep cultural ancestry predicts the United Nations
Human Development Index (HDI) for 44 Eurasian countries,
using language ancestry as a proxy for cultural relatedness
and controlling for three additional factors—geographical
proximity, religion and former communism. While cultural
ancestry alone predicts HDI and its subcomponents (income,
health and education indices), when geographical proximity is
included only income and health indices remain significant and
the effect is small. When communism and religion variables are
included, cultural ancestry is no longer a significant predictor;
communism significantly negatively predicts HDI, income
and health indices, and Muslim percentage of the population
significantly negatively predicts education index, although the
latter result may not be robust. These findings indicate that
geographical proximity and recent cultural history—especially
communism—are more important than deep cultural factors
in current human development and suggest the efficacy of
modern policy initiatives is not tightly constrained by cultural
ancestry.
2018 The Authors. Published by the Royal Society under the terms of the Creative Commons
Attribution License http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/, which permits unrestricted
use, provided the original author and source are credited.
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1. Introduction
1.1. Human development
Despite decades of global economic growth, there remain stark disparities in levels of development
between nations, with significant implications for human welfare. The widely cited United Nations
(UN) Human Development Index (HDI) [1] combines economic, health and education metrics to
provide a proxy for human welfare designed to capture the extent to which residents of a country
can enjoy long, healthy and meaningful lives. At one end of the spectrum, for example, Norway
enjoys high per capita income (US$47 500) and life expectancy (81 years) and many attend school into
early adulthood [2]. By contrast, in Bangladesh per capita income and life expectancy are much lower
(US$1530 and 68 years) and people have on average less than five years of schooling [2]. While such
measures cannot capture all facets of human welfare [3], identifying what factors predict metrics like
HDI is important for understanding the forces shaping global development [4,5] and for guiding policy
decisions [6,7].
1.2. Factors affecting human development
Variation in development has been linked to a range of variables. Geography and the associated
environmental variation has often been cited as a factor that may limit or impede development [4,5,8].
For example, the problems posed by lack of waterways for inland, continental areas [8–10], and the
difficulties of the tropical climate [5,8] have been cited as reasons why certain areas have had low levels
of human development. Early authors infamously suggested that genetic inheritance dictates human
development [11], and some continue to do so [12], but such work is generally held to be fundamentally
flawed [13–15]. There is some evidence that intermediate levels of genetic diversity may positively affect
development [16], though this remains highly controversial [17]. Correlations found between economic
development and genetic relatedness may rather be due to cultural and geographical proximity being
well predicted by genetic distance [18,19].
Cultural factors, in the form of social norms, institutions and religions have also been cited as
potentially affecting economic growth and human development [20]. For example, both formal (legal)
and informal (social) rules such as property rights and the structure of the institutions of government
have been widely linked to development outcomes [21–23]. Others have characterized systems of
governance such as centrally planned economies and dictatorships as inefficient and leading to lower
economic performance [24,25], although the reasons for this are complex and multifaceted [26]. Religion
has been suggested as another factor underlying relative economic performance of different countries,
with Protestantism famously suggested as driving strong growth in northern Europe by Weber [27,28],
and more recent studies specifically investigating this issue [29,30].
1.2.1. History and human development
The impact of history on current socioeconomic development has been increasingly investigated and
acknowledged: the importance of history is now little debated, and means to quantify and assess
this importance are being refined [31]. Initial work in this field focused on the continuing effects of
colonialism on modern post-colonial countries [32–36], but has expanded to investigate topics ranging
from the effects of historic borders on government quality measured by vaccination levels [37] to the
impact of the Habsburg Empire on modern European development [38]. Increasingly comprehensive
datasets, especially for more limited geographical areas, have allowed robust statistical assessment of
the importance of historical factors [39,40]. Observation of the intransigence of economies following a
suboptimal period of extreme historical extraction has led to the formulation of the idea of multiple
equilibria, where historical trauma can push an economy to a suboptimal, but stable, equilibrium,
from which it is difficult to escape [41]. The effects of particular historical incidents on trajectories of
socioeconomic development—path dependence—has also been documented [42].
History also interacts with geographical and cultural factors [31]. Examples include the hypothesis
that geographical access to Atlantic trade routes facilitated development of more effective cultural
institutions in Western Europe [43], or the continued effects on local economies of the type of
administration during colonial rule in India, when geographically favourable areas were preferentially
placed under direct rule [40]. Such interactions complicate the task of identifying key variables, and
emphasize the importance of taking multiple factors into account.
 on July 2, 2018http://rsos.royalsocietypublishing.org/Downloaded from 
3rsos.royalsocietypublishing.org
R.Soc.opensci.5:171411
................................................
1.2.1.1. The role of shared cultural history and cultural relatedness
One aspect of history, the development impacts of which have begun to be increasingly investigated, is
cultural similarity and relatedness; cultural closeness may lead to similar socioeconomic outcomes, and
may facilitate intercultural spread of traits. Spolaore & Wacziarg [18,19] investigated the correlation of
genetic relatedness between societies with economic indicators. They found that genetic distance from
the ‘world technological frontier’ (Britain in the nineteenth and the USA in the twentieth century) was
negatively correlated with economic prosperity, and hypothesized that this effect was the result of easier
cultural dissemination between more closely related societies.
Another approach to investigate the effect of cultural relatedness that has begun to be relatively
widely employed in cultural anthropology [44–52]—but little applied to economic or developmental
data—is the use of language phylogenies to capture ‘deep cultural ancestry’—i.e. the vertical pattern
of descent between cultures, often spanning hundreds of years. As cultures diverge, so too do their
languages, making language ancestry a useful proxy for cultural relatedness [52–54]. Recently, tools from
evolutionary biology have been applied to linguistic data to infer dated family trees of the world’s major
language families [55–59]. This approach compares the words for basic meanings across languages and
models language change as the gain and loss of homologous words (or ‘cognates’) along the branches of
a phylogeny, a process analogous to the gain and loss of homologous genes or morphological features
on a species tree [60]. The resulting language family trees capture deep cultural connections between
the cultures concerned, and have been successfully used to predict variation across socio-cultural traits
in traditional [47,51,61] and modern societies [52] and to test hypotheses about patterns of cultural
evolution through time [48–50].
1.3. Aims and approach of the current study
The aim of the current work is to investigate the application of cultural phylogenies derived from
linguistic data, as has been successfully applied in cultural anthropology, to the most widely used
development indicator—the HDI and its subcomponents—to assess whether deep cultural ancestry
impacts major aspects of human development. To do this we use a phylogenetic generalized least-squares
approach [62], initially developed in evolutionary biology, to simultaneously quantify and control for the
effects of phylogeny, geography and other cofactors.
We use a modified version of Bouckaert et al.’s [58] phylogeny of the Indo-European languages as
a proxy for cultural relatedness. While the precise timescale of Indo-European diversification remains
controversial, the ancestral relationships represented in the phylogeny span a range stretching back as
far as 6000–9000 BP [58]. We test for phylogenetic signal in the components of the United Nations HDI
for Indo-European speaking Eurasian countries.
Alongside the impact of deep culture, we take into account three other control factors potentially
linked to development, namely the role of geographical proximity, the prevalence of four major religious
traditions, and whether that country had, or continues to have, a communist dictatorial government.
The latter two variables have played important roles in the cultural history of Indo-European speaking
countries, and have been hypothesized or shown to affect human development indicators. Including
these predictors in our analysis allows us to control for the impact of more recent religious or political
trends on development. Including geographical distance in our analysis allows us to control for
geographical patterns that can arise due to regional ecological differences and the horizontal diffusion
of ideas. In addition, we simultaneously quantify the relative importance of these successive layers of
cultural influence—deep cultural ancestry, geographical proximity, religious history and a history of
communism—in order to assess their relative impact in cases where more than one factor may be of
importance.
2. Material and methods
2.1. Data
2.1.1. Development indicators
Development data in the form of the HDI and its components were collected from the 2013 United
Nations Human Development Report ([2]. The UN created the HDI as an alternative to gross national
income (GNI) to measure of the level of development of a country [1]. HDI is made up of three equally
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weighted subcomponents: (1) an income index, a standardized transformation of GNI per capita; (2) a
health index, a standardized transformation of life expectancy at birth and (3) an education index, a
standardized combination of mean and expected years schooling. For each country in our sample, we
collected data on HDI as well as its three subcomponents.
In order to minimize the effects of short-term fluctuations in development indicators, we take a
country’s score for each index as the average score of the years given in the 2013 Human Development
Report ([2], table 2: Human Development Index trends, 1980–2012) which includes the years 1980, 1990,
2000 and 2005–2012. An analysis of variance shows country explains between 87% and 99% of the
variance in indices across years (HDI, F= 1314.0, η2 = 0.995, p< 0.001; income index, F= 577.5, η2 = 0.986,
p< 0.001; health index, F= 73.0, η2 = 0.877, p< 0.001; education index, F= 1475.9, η2 = 0.996, p< 0.001),
justifying this approach. To correct for broad trends through time, each year’s data are standardized
across countries before averaging. In addition, we excluded years for which data were missing for more
than one country. The resulting data matrix is recorded in electronic supplementary material, table S1.
2.1.2. Language ancestry
In order to quantify and control for the effects of deep cultural ancestry, we matched countries in the UN
development dataset to languages from the Indo-European language study of Bouckaert et al. [58]. This
allowed us to use the cognate data from Bouckaert et al. as the basis of our phylogenies; we conducted
a new analysis based on these data because we wished to add additional languages (see below) while
obtaining a full posterior sample of trees. Since linguistic (and cultural) borders are less well defined
than the lines that demarcate national borders, judgements had to be made about which language was
most appropriate to link to each country. Our criteria for matching a country to a language were that the
language was the official language or the predominant language spoken in a country. Thirty-six countries
were matched to languages in this way. To maximize sample size, an additional eight Indo-European
national languages not covered by the analysis of Bouckaert et al. were also included, because their
position on the language tree is undisputed and it was relatively straightforward to incorporate them
into the priors of our Bayesian phylogenetic inference procedure (see below). These eight languages
were: Austrian German, Cypriot Greek, Irish English, Liechtenstein German, and Moldovan, plus the
separation of Serbocroatian into Serbian, Croatian, Bosnian-Herzegovinian and Montenegrin branches.
This produced a total of 44 language-to-country pairings in our analysis (electronic supplementary
material, table S1).
We derive the ancestral relationships between languages based on the presence or absence of cognates
(homologous words) for the languages in our sample, using the approach outlined in [58]. Cognate data
for each language comprised the 200 meanings of the Swadesh word list [63]. These are basic vocabulary
terms that are relatively universal and resistant to borrowing—a good example of this resistance comes
from modern English, where over 50% of the lexicon consists of loanwords from Romance languages,
but where this figure falls to around 6% for the Swadesh 200 word list [64].
Following previous computational approaches to the evolution of languages [55,58], we model
language change as the gain and loss of cognates through time, using Bayesian phylogenetic inference
as implemented in BEAST 1.7.5 [65] to infer the likely set of plausible language trees. We constructed
a posterior distribution of language trees relating the 44 languages in our sample. We used a covarion
model with an uncorrelated relaxed clock [66] and time depth calibrated based on known divergence
times (see [58]). In addition to the 36 languages for which cognate data was available, we added eight
Indo-European language–country pairings that were either not represented in the Bouckaert et al. [58]
Indo-European phylogeny or that involved a language shared with another country. These additional
languages were added to the analysis based on historical evidence of approximate divergence events
with each language’s closest relatives (see electronic supplementary material, table S2).
We ran five separate Markov chains for 100 million iterations, sampling every 10 000th tree. The first
20 million iterations of each chain was discarded as burn-in. Examination of parameter traces in BEAST’s
Tracer tool indicated that the analyses had reached convergence by this point and yielded effective
sample sizes of at least 100. From the total post burn-in sample of 400 million trees we randomly sampled
a set of 1000 trees for analysis. Figure 1 shows the location of the countries in our sample and a maximum
clade credibility tree with HDI data mapped onto the tips.
2.1.3. Religion and communist history
In order to account for the effect of religious history of the countries in our sample, we incorporated the
percentage of adherents to each of five religious groups—Catholicism, Protestantism, Eastern Orthodoxy,
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7. B & H 18. Iran 29. Pakistan 40. Sweden
8. Bulgaria 19. Ireland 30. Poland 41. Tajikistan
9. Croatia 20. Italy 31. Portugal 42. Macedonia
10. Cyprus 21. Latvia 32. Rep. Moldova 43. Ukraine
11. Czech Rep. 22. Liechtenstein 33. Romania 44. UK
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Figure 1. (a) Map showing the location of the 44 countries in our sample. Country regions are coloured according to HDI score from
darker (low) to brighter (high). Coloured circles indicate major linguistic sub-groups—Germanic (green), Balto-Slavic (yellow), Italic
(pink), Indo-Iranian (blue) and other (white). (b) Maximum clade credibility tree of 44 Indo-European languages corresponding to the
countries in our sample, based on a Bayesian posterior sample of 1000 trees. The tips of the tree are colour coded according to HDI and its
three subcomponents from darker (low) to brighter (high). Coloured boxes indicate major linguistic sub-groups as in panel (a).
Islam and ‘Other’—as a predictor variable. The sample did not include enough countries with large
enough numbers of adherents to the religions in the ‘Other’ category to make subcategorization
meaningful. Islam was not subdivided into, for example, Shı¯‘ah and Sunnı¯ branches because no
 on July 2, 2018http://rsos.royalsocietypublishing.org/Downloaded from 
6rsos.royalsocietypublishing.org
R.Soc.opensci.5:171411
................................................
hypotheses have been proposed relating these sects to economic or developmental indicators (unlike
with Protestantism—see above), and because only one country in the sample—Iran—is majority Shı¯‘ah.
We included an additional binary variable indicating the presence of rule of the majority of the
country by a self-professed communist party, currently or in the country’s history [67]. Germany was
treated as non-communist because the majority of the country never experienced communist rule (only
development data for the Federal Republic of Germany were used). These data are recorded in electronic
supplementary material, table S1.
2.2. Analysis
We adapt an approach developed in evolutionary biology by Freckleton & Jetz [62] to jointly estimate
the covariance of cultural ancestry and geographical proximity with development indicators, and the
relative effects of our religion and communism covariates. This method uses a version of phylogenetic
generalized least squares (PGLS [68]) that incorporates, alongside conventional regression covariates,
information on both the phylogenetic and geographical distances between data points. This allows us
to simultaneously quantify and control for the degree to which cultural ancestry and spatial proximity
explain covariation in development outcomes. This approach has already been applied to cross-cultural
data in the Pacific to predict cultural variation in forest outcomes across islands [51].
Two parameters, λ and φ, ranging between 0 and 1 represent the influence of cultural ancestry and
geographical proximity effects respectively and are used to modify the standard variance matrix (V)
according to the following formula:
V(λ, φ) = (1 − φ)[(1 − λ)h+ λΣ] + φW,
where λ represents the magnitude of non-independence in the outcome variable due to shared ancestry
effects and φ represents the same for spatial effects. Σ is an n×n matrix comprising the shared path
lengths on the phylogeny. This is proportional to the expected variances and covariances for traits under
a Brownian motion model of evolution [69]. We constructΣ using pairwise phylogenetic divergence from
the Indo-European language phylogeny. W is the spatial matrix comprising pairwise distances between
sample locations. We calculate W as the distance between the capital cities of each country based on the
haversine formula [70]. h is formed from the diagonal of Σ , which is the distance from the start of the
phylogeny to each terminal node. In our data h is constant because there are no extinct languages in our
phylogeny.
Following Freckleton & Jetz [62], we can rewrite the above equation as:
V(λ, φ) = γh+ λ′Σ + φW,
where γ = (1 −φ)(1 − λ) is the proportion of covariance independent of phylogeny and space,
λ
′ = (1 −φ)λ is the proportion of modelled covariance attributable to phylogeny and φ is the proportion
of modelled covariance attributable to spatial effects. Thus covariance is a weighted sum of components
proportional to shared cultural ancestry (λ
′
), geographical proximity (φ), and a random component (γ ).
We note that λ
′
and φ should be interpreted as the proportion of modelled covariance in the outcome
variables, not as a proportion of overall variance explained. λ and φ are determined by maximizing the
log-likelihood of the phylogenetic least-squares regression model. Parameter values are estimated using
an exhaustive grid search of the parameter-space which explores all values between 0 and 1 with 0.02
increments. The significance of phylogenetic and geographical influence is tested using a likelihood ratio
test between models fitting both λ and φ, only λ, only φ, or neither λ nor φ.
Coefficients are estimated using maximum likelihood. We modelled the fixed effects of communism
and the four religions as the direct effect of each of the dummy variables on each dependent variable
within the PGLS framework [62]. In order to account for uncertainty in the ancestral relationships
between Indo-European languages, all analyses incorporating λ
′
were run across the Bayesian posterior
distribution of 1000 Indo-European language trees. Where phylogeny was included in the model, we
report mean and 95% confidence intervals for parameter estimates across the posterior distribution
of trees.
Data were analysed in three phases. First, to explore general patterns in the data we report the
bivariate effects of each predictor on each development indicator. Second, because we wished to test
the effect of phylogeny against one of the most commonly cited causal factors in human development—
geographical location—we fitted a single regression jointly estimating the effect of both phylogeny and
geography. Third, we included communism and religion, as two important recent cultural variables,
alongside phylogeny and geography in the jointly fitted regression, to simultaneously estimate the effects
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Table 1. Results of bivariate regressionpredictingHDI and its subcomponents. Thefirst two rows showmeanestimates froman intercept-
only PGLS analysis testing for either cultural ancestry (λ) or geographical distance (φ) effects. We used likelihood ratio tests to evaluate
support for these models against a null model with no ancestry or geographical proximity effects. The remaining columns show mean,
95% confidence intervals and p-values of theβ-coefficients from ordinary least-squares (OLS) bivariate regressions of each predictor on
each development indicator. Significance levels: *< 0.05; **< 0.01; ***< 0.001.
predictor HDI income index health index education index
shared ancestry (λ) mean 0.975*** 0.895*** 0.999*** 0.944***
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
95% CI (0.823, 1.00) (0.637, 1.00) (0.930, 1.00) (0.741, 1.00)
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
geographical
proximity (φ)
mean 0.980*** 0.980*** 0.980*** 0.960***
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
95% CI (0.935, 1.00) (0.950, 1.00) (0.865, 1.00) (0.870, 1.00)
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Protestant mean 0.0157** 0.0154** 0.0133* 0.00274***
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
95% CI (0.0136, 0.0179) (0.0132, 0.0176) (0.0111, 0.0155) (0.00235, 0.00313)
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Catholic mean 0.0127*** 0.0146** 0.0120*** 0.00161*
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
95% CI (0.0112, 0.0142) (0.0132, 0.0161) (0.0105, 0.0135) (0.00132, 0.0019)
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Orthodox mean −0.0011 −0.00359 −0.00216 0.000462
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
95% CI (−0.0029, 0.0007) (−0.00538,−0.0018) (−0.00393,−0.000384) (0.00014, 0.000784)
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Muslim mean −0.0210*** −0.0192*** −0.0189*** −0.00383*
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
95% CI (−0.0225,−0.0195) (−0.0208,−0.0176) (−0.0205,−0.0174) (−0.0041,−0.00356)
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
communism mean −0.397 −0.653* −0.701* 0.0144
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
95% CI (−0.515,−0.279) (−0.767,−0.539) (−0.811,−0.590) (−0.00714, 0.0360)
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
of all these factors. All analyses were conducted in the R v. 3.0.1 statistical package [71]. Routines for
PGLS-spatial are available on request from the authors of Freckleton & Jetz [62].
Finally, cultural ancestry and geographical proximity themselves covary, because cultures expand
across the landscape. The resulting collinearity may make it impossible to differentiate between
covariation due to cultural ancestry and geographical proximity. In the text of the electronic
supplementary material, we check whether this applies to our sample of Indo-European speaking
nations, by simulating the evolution of continuous traits with varying degrees of phylogenetic signal
on the Indo-European tree. This analysis shows that the approach we use here can reliably identify traits
that show covariation with geographical proximity or cultural distances. We also show that the method
correctly identifies an archetypal geographically autocorrelated trait (mean temperature) as related to
geographical proximity and not phylogeny (see electronic supplementary material).
3. Results
Table 1 reports bivariate statistical tests for a relationship between the development indicators and
deep cultural ancestry (λ) or geographical proximity (φ), as well as religion and communism. We
find strong phylogenetic signal in all of the development indicators (λ> 0.89 across indicators)—i.e.
across the phylogeny, development scores covary strongly with cultural ancestry. Figure 1 illustrates
this relationship, showing HDI and its subcomponents mapped onto the Indo-European language
phylogeny. Table 1 also reveals a strong geographical signal (φ > 0.97 across indicators), positive effects
of Protestantism and Catholicism and negative effects of Islam across all indicators, as well as negative
effects of communism on the income and health indices. Pairwise correlations between all predictors are
shown in electronic supplementary material, table S3.
Table 2 shows phylogeny and geography analysed together in a multivariate PGLS [62] framework,
where both variables are fitted simultaneously, thereby controlling for one another. Table 2 indicates that
geography is a significant predictor of HDI and all its subcomponents, whereas phylogeny is a minor but
significant predictor of health and income indices.
Table 3 shows results when all predictors—including religion and communism—are analysed
simultaneously using the PGLS framework. This reveals that deep cultural ancestry does not significantly
predict any response variable after controlling for other factors. Geographical proximity significantly
predicts similarity in HDI and income index. Communism was significantly negatively associated with
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Table 2. Results from multivariate PGLS regressions predicting HDI and its subcomponents, incorporating phylogenetic and spatial
effects. The table shows mean and 95% highest posterior density (HPD) of shared ancestry (λ′) and geographical distance (φ) effects
across the posterior sample of 1000 trees. Significance tests reflect the mean p-value across the posterior distribution of trees and
incorporate both stochastic and phylogenetic uncertainty. Significance levels: *< 0.05; **< 0.01; ***< 0.001. .
predictor HDI income index health index education index
shared ancestry (λ′) mean 0.0482 0.0352** 0.2850*** 0.0009
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
95% HPD (0.005, 0.118) (0.02, 0.04) (0.22, 0.34) (0.00, 0.00)
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
geographical proximity (φ) mean 0.943*** 0.965*** 0.715** 0.959*
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
95% HPD (0.88, 0.98) (0.96, 0.98) (0.64, 0.76) (0.96, 0.96)
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Table3. Results frommultivariatePGLS regressionspredictingHDI and its subcomponents, incorporatingphylogenetic and spatial effects
and religion and communism independent variables. The table shows median and 95% HPD of shared ancestry (λ′) and geographical
distance (φ) effects across the posterior sample of 1000 trees. Also shown areβ estimates and 95%HPD for the religion and communism
predictors, averaged across the posterior sample of 1000 trees. Significance tests reflect themean p-value across the posterior distribution
of trees and incorporate both stochastic and phylogenetic uncertainty. Significance levels: *< 0.05; **< 0.01; ***< 0.001.
predictor HDI income index health index education index
shared
ancestry (λ′)
mean 0.0055 0.0104 0.513 0.0862
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
95% HPD (0.00, 0.00) (0.00, 0.0128) (0.00, 1.00) (0.00, 0.90)
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
geographical
proximity (φ)
mean 0.975** 0.982*** 0.486 0.851
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
95% HPD (0.98, 0.98) (0.98, 1.00) (0.00, 0.96) (0.00, 0.94)
Protestant mean 0.00092 0.00183 0.00307 0.00081
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
95% HPD (−0.00010, 0.00284) (0.00014, 0.00351) (0.00071, 0.00543) (0.00037, 0.00125)
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Catholic mean −0.00026 0.00234 0.00075 −0.00005
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
95% HPD (−0.00156, 0.00105) (0.00126, 0.00341) (−0.00049, 0.00198) (−0.00037, 0.00027)
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Orthodox mean −0.00306 −0.00127 −0.00419 −0.00017
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
95% HPD (−0.00440,−0.00172) (−0.00244,−0.000101) (−0.00561,−0.00276) (−0.00048, 0.00015)
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Muslim mean −0.00584 −0.00339 −0.00270 −0.00145*
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
95% HPD (−0.00699,−0.00468) (−0.00444,−0.00234) (−0.00403,−0.00137) (−0.00172,−0.00118)
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
communism mean −0.518** −0.792* −0.768*** 0.00055
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
95% HPD (−0.587,−0.449) (−0.860,−0.725) (−0.890,−0.645) (−0.0165, 0.0176)
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
income index, health index and HDI as a whole, but not education index. There was no significant effect
of Protestantism, Catholicism or Orthodox Christianity but Muslim countries showed significantly lower
scores on education index.
Since communism predicted both income index and health index (table 3), which are themselves
correlated (electronic supplementary material, table S3), we ran a follow-up analysis including income
index as an additional predictor of health index, in order to determine whether national income mediates
the effect of communism on health. This indicates that communism is no longer a significant predictor
of health index (βcommunism =−0.25, p= 0.478) when controlling for income index (β incomeindex = 0.507,
p< 0.01).
4. Discussion
4.1. Cultural ancestry alone predicts human development
The bivariate analyses presented in table 1 indicate that, in the absence of any other control variables,
deep cultural ancestry strongly covaries with HDI and its components, income index, health index
and education index. Language phylogenies alone are thus able to account for a substantial portion of
variation in development indicators between countries. While this could arise due to direct inheritance
of the traits in question, in the case of HDI it appears more likely to be due to the presence of omitted
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predictor variables that are themselves correlated with the phylogeny due to cultural inheritance, biased
diffusion or chance. An analogy can be made here with biology, where species phylogenies are powerful
predictors of variation in many traits, including those not inherited in the conventional sense [72]. For
example, latitude and rainfall covary with species phylogenies due to a combination of habitat selection
and the fact that one generation tends to be born into an environment similar to the previous generation
[72]. As a result, regardless of the mechanism of inheritance, species phylogenies predict unmodelled
variation in a range of traits across taxa [68]; our findings show that the same may be true of cultural
phylogenies.
4.2. Incorporating geography
Geography alone is also a significant predictor of HDI and its components (table 1). When included
in the model alongside cultural phylogeny, geography remains a significant predictor for all response
variables (all φ > 0.7), while phylogeny remains a significant predictor of income and health indices,
although its effect is small (φ of 0.28 and 0.04, respectively). This indicates geography is more important
than cultural ancestry for all aspects of the HDI and accords with the great importance of geography
previously highlighted by many authors [4,5,8–10] (see §4.2.1 below).
4.2.1. The effect of geography on Human Development Index
The influence of geography on HDI found potentially corroborates a large body of work documenting
effects of climate, natural resources, and transportation and communication barriers on economic growth
and development [5,9,10,73,74]. The Indo-European languages span a large geographical area with
climates ranging from boreal to tropical [75]. Tropical diseases can negatively impact longevity [5] and
may help explain the poorer development indicators of tropical and subtropical countries, represented
in our dataset by India, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka and Pakistan (although HDI is relatively high in Sri
Lanka). Weather-related disasters are also more prevalent in tropical areas, with tropical cyclones causing
more deaths than any other natural hazard [76] alongside infrastructure damage which further impedes
development [77]. Large arid inland areas in Afghanistan, Pakistan, Tajikistan and Iran (see [75]) may
also impede development, as lack of sea access can limit trade [78], and aridity can impede food and
water supply [79].
It should also be noted, however, that horizontally transferred (i.e. borrowed from other cultures,
rather than inherited) cultural traits may also contribute to the importance of geographical proximity.
Cultural traits should be more easily and frequently transferred between neighbouring countries.
Examples of the spread of such traits are abundant historically, with, for example, industrialization
spreading rapidly into Western Europe from Great Britain [80], but taking much longer to begin in
Russia [81]. Even if improved transport and communications may make policymakers increasingly aware
of policies in countries far away from their own, the spread of cultural traits between populations as
a whole should be more likely between neighbouring countries. Distinguishing between the effects of
environment and communication distance requires further work (the focus here was not geography),
although the distance matrix used is a better approximation of physical distance than of climatic
dissimilarity between countries.
4.2.2. Phylogeny continues to predict health and income index
Controlling for geographical proximity, phylogeny continues to be a minor, but significant predictor
of health and education indices. Such a pattern could indicate vertical inheritance of traits linked
to these development outcomes, or may be due to phylogeny covarying with other unaccounted-
for variables. Possible candidates for such variables are borrowed cultural influences (e.g. political
system, or religion—see §4.3), environmental factors or genetics. Cultural factors are perhaps more
likely, because genetic proximity in Europe, and environment, are already well predicted by geography
[82]. There remains, however, the possibility that a small part of genetic proximity varies with the
phylogeny, and that this affects, for example, longevity; further work would be required to completely
exclude this possibility, and would be of interest given that genetics are likely to influence longevity
in particular [83,84]. Furthermore, Spolaore & Wacziarg [18,19] indeed find a correspondence between
genetic relatedness and economic indicators, but attribute this to cultural inheritance—disentangling
both factors fully is an avenue of future research.
If cultural phylogeny were to really exert an influence on health and income, direct inheritance
of the traits involved is unlikely because most innovations underlying modern income and health
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metrics are far more recent than most splits in the language phylogeny. Two alternative explanations
are (i) underlying inherited cultural traits facilitated parallel development of structures increasing both
metrics (e.g. industrial production, powered transportation, sanitation) in more closely related societies,
or (ii) borrowing between more closely related cultures faces fewer impediments, and thus innovations
spread more rapidly into more closely related than more distantly related cultures. There is evidence for
both possibilities [85], but in the European context, borrowing would have been likely to have been more
important as key innovations such as industrialization [86], mass education [87] and social insurance [88]
are documented as originating in one country and spreading, not evolving independently. This would
accord with recent work by Spolaore & Wacziarg [18,19] positing that cultural distance from the ‘world
technological frontier’ and barriers to adoption of new innovations explain the effects of genetic distance
on economic development and other work indicating that cultural and linguistic relatedness predicts
aspects of the economic performance of nation states [52].
4.3. Incorporating recent cultural factors—religion and communism
Our bivariate analyses show that the recent cultural factors examined—communist history and
religion—are, taken alone, good predictors of the Human Development Index and its components
(table 1). When incorporated alongside phylogeny and geography, phylogeny ceases to be a significant
predictor of HDI or any of its components, meaning recent cultural factors combined with geography
can account for covariation between HDI and cultural phylogeny (table 3). Communism significantly
negatively predicts HDI, income and health indices, but religion ceases to be a significant predictor except
for a negative correlation between Islam and education index. These results support a significant effect
of communist history on the human development of countries, comparable to the effects of geography
(which remains a significant predictor of HDI and income index), and more immediately important than
cultural phylogeny or religion.
4.3.1. Communism and religion as mediators of cultural ancestry
Together with geography, recent cultural factors—especially communist history—provide a better
explanation than deep cultural phylogeny for HDI values. However, it is worth noting that these recent
cultural factors may in part mediate the relationship between HDI and cultural phylogeny—i.e. rather
than communism and religion explaining away the effects of deep cultural ancestry on modern cultural
variation, they may in fact be an example of it.
Electronic supplementary material, table S3 shows that communism itself covaries strongly with deep
cultural ancestry. All Balto-Slavic-speaking countries in the dataset were at one point communist. This is
in large part due to the political influence of Russia—both the Russian Empire [89] and subsequently
the USSR [90]—on the surrounding countries, which, unsurprisingly, often spoke related languages.
However, it is probable that cultural and linguistic similarity played a role in the continued influence
of Russia on Slavic-speaking countries in the Balkans and Eastern Europe. For example, after World
War II, Greece entered the Western bloc, while neighbouring Slavic-speaking Bulgaria and Yugoslavia
entered the Eastern bloc and were previously long allied to Russia [90,91]. Similarly, Slavic-speaking
Czechoslovakia entered the Eastern bloc whereas neighbouring largely Germanic-speaking Austria
entered the Western bloc [90]. While these events were, of course, due to political decisions and conflict
outcomes, they can still be looked upon as part of the documented pattern of generally stronger cultural
ties between linguistically similar countries [52].
Similarly, three of the four religion variables covary with deep cultural ancestry (electronic
supplementary material, table S1). All countries with Protestant majorities, and most with large
(greater than 10%) Protestant populations, in the dataset are Germanic-speaking, and while this
correspondence is not clear-cut (e.g. Slovakia and Latvia have a large Protestant population), the pattern
of spread/retention of religions is plausibly attributable to linguistic and other aspects of deep cultural
similarity facilitating their spread and maintenance. While social change is not strongly impeded by deep
cultural phylogeny, exchange of ideas may well be facilitated by it.
4.3.2. The effect of communism on Human Development Index
Communist history shows a significant negative correlation with the national income of the countries
in our dataset. Post World War II economic growth in communist countries was modest, especially
during the 1970s and 1980s, relative to non-communist European countries [92], and the centrally
planned economy of communist countries has long been held by economically liberal theoreticians to
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hamper conventional economic growth [93–95]. Although the countries in the dataset had abandoned
communism for most of the years in the dataset, the residual effect of communism appears to still be
detectable. Institutional and cultural traits produced by communism and by dictatorship may continue
to retard growth today, with corruption still regarded as higher in Eastern than Western Europe [96]
and linked to lower national income [97]. It should also be noted, however, that many of the former
communist countries (largely those in the former Soviet Union) also suffered major economic turmoil
following the demise of their communist governments [98], and that this too may play a role in explaining
the apparent effect of communism on income. Moreover, it must be noted that the communist countries
in the sample are all Eastern European and Central Asian, and that these areas were less wealthy than
Western Europe even prior to communism [92,99], and indeed Russia saw rapid economic growth
following the advent of communism, although this lessened over time [92,100]. For all these reasons
the results presented here must be treated with caution, and are primarily intended as a control in the
context of examination of deep cultural effects on human development, not as a thoroughgoing analysis
of the effects of communism on development.
Communism also shows a significant negative association with health index (i.e. normalized
longevity), although only at p= 0.05 level. This confirms the stagnation and even decline of life
expectancy in Europe under communism during the 1970s and 1980s, corresponding to years of low
economic growth (see above), which has continued to set formerly communist countries back in terms
of life expectancy until today [101,102]. The proximate causes for this low life expectancy are complex,
but high alcohol consumption, smoking and poor workplace safety, as well as low quality diet and living
conditions associated with lower income levels are implicated [101]. Most of the same caveats also apply
here as to the economic effects of communism however, with lifespan decreasing rapidly in the former
Soviet Union immediately following post-Soviet collapse [101], and lifespan having increased strongly
in the Soviet Union prior to and immediately after World War II [103].
Longevity greatly increased during recent centuries in Europe in part due to generally rising
living standards (and thereby nutrition [104]), with increasing health and longevity interacting with
the economy in a positive feedback loop [105]. Communist history may thus have also influenced
longevity via its effect on income, with income being a significant predictor of health index (electronic
supplementary material, table S1). Consistent with this explanation, we find that communism is no
longer a significant predictor of health index when controlling for income index.
4.3.3. The effect of religion on Human Development Index
The only correlation between religion and human development which remains in the model including
all predictor variables is a negative of Islam with education index. This may be due to lower female
enrolment—with education largely restricted to males in many Islamic societies at the start of the
twentieth century [106]—or due to a traditional focus on religious rather than secular education [107].
Alternatively, the correlation may be spurious. The nature of the dataset means that three majority
Muslim countries have very low education indices (Afghanistan 0.306, Bangladesh 0.377, Pakistan 0.353,
sample average 0.719), and Iran also shows a below-average education index (0.618). However, education
level is also low in neighbouring India (0.433) and Nepal (0.348), which are predominantly Hindu (81.3%
and 79.8% respectively, although 14.2% of India’s population are Muslim [67]), but which share many
non-religious aspects of cultural history.
The female : male secondary education ratio is lower than most of the sample for the South Asian
Muslim countries and Iran, and may be connected to patriarchal social structures [108]. Whether this
can be directly attributed to Islam per se is questionable, however. In the sample, several countries with
majority or very large (greater than 30%) Muslim populations have very high education indices and
female enrolment (Albania, Macedonia, Tajikistan), although this may partly be due to a mitigating
effect of communist history (which is factored out in our joint analysis), with relatively high educational
level given the income level in many Eastern bloc countries [109], especially of women [110], and a
positive (although non-significant) association found between communism and education in this sample.
However, globally, several predominantly Muslim countries with no communist history today have
education levels and female enrolment at least as high as similarly developed predominantly non-
Muslim countries; the current education index of Brunei and Saudi Arabia is higher than that of Portugal
and close to that of Spain and Greece, while the education index of women in Qatar, the United Arab
Emirates and Brunei is higher than that for men, and the female : male education index ratio of the
latter three countries is higher than in Spain, Portugal or Greece (see electronic supplementary material,
table S4). A wider-scale and more nuanced analysis may allow firmer conclusions.
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Interestingly, after controlling for other covariates, we find no effect of Protestantism on development,
contra the famous hypotheses of Weber [27,28] and some more recent empirical work [29,111].
Protestantism was historically specifically contrasted with Catholicism, which was hypothesized to
impede economic growth. However, in our dataset some predominantly Catholic countries were among
the best performing economically (Luxembourg and Austria were the second and fifth highest income
indices, respectively, ahead of six and four predominantly Protestant countries, respectively), and
the data examined here provides no solid evidence supporting the idea of Protestantism improving
economic welfare. It should perhaps, however, be noted that several countries with a historically very
strong Protestant tradition (Czech Republic, Germany, The Netherlands, United Kingdom) now have
large (greater than 20%) non-religious populations (see electronic supplementary material, table S1),
which may mask a historic economic impact of Protestantism.
4.4. Conclusion
Our analysis is the first to combine high-resolution language phylogenies with PGLS to simultaneously
examine the effects of cultural phylogeny, geography and recent cultural factors on development. Our
results show that while deep cultural ancestry alone can predict variation in HDI indicators, this
relationship is better attributable to the effect of geography and recent cultural changes, which emerge
as more important predictors of human development. The absence of a strong independent effect of
cultural ancestry is a broadly hopeful conclusion for policymakers, for it indicates that development
outcomes are not tightly constrained by deep cultural inheritance and are, therefore, more likely to be
amenable to policy change. However, our findings also add to the large body of literature underlining the
importance of a potentially less malleable factor—geography—in affecting development. Development
outcomes are likely to be constrained by geography to the extent that the geographical proximity
effects we identify reflect direct environmental influence. The effect of geography may, however, be due
to its influence on cultural diffusion, and, therefore, geographical impediments may be increasingly
overcome by improved communication. Nevertheless, the potential effect of deep cultural ancestry
should not be entirely ignored and should continue to be tested; cultural phylogeny is closely associated
with HDI values, and although recent cultural developments have a more important role than deep
cultural phylogeny in development outcomes, as we note above, the spread and maintenance of these
developments themselves may be facilitated by linguistic and cultural phylogenetic proximity. It should
also be noted that the focus on a relatively small sample of 44 countries speaking Indo-European
languages may have limited our statistical power to detect effects that are in fact present—potentially
including a cultural phylogenetic effect—particularly in the multivariate analysis. Larger-scale analysis
of the causal relationships between development outcomes, geography, religion, political ideology and
deep cultural phylogeny around the globe would thus be a fruitful avenue of further research.
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